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How did the Subprime Crisis, a problem in a small corner of U.S. financial markets, affect the entire
global banking system? To shed light on this question we use principal components analysis to identify
common factors in the movement of banks' credit default swap spreads.  We find that fortunes of 
international banks rise and fall together even in normal times along with short-term global economic
prospects.  But the importance of common factors rose steadily to exceptional levels from the outbreak
of the Subprime Crisis to past the rescue of Bear Stearns, reflecting a diffuse sense that funding and
credit risk was increasing. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the interdependencies briefly
increased to a new high, before they fell back to the pre-Lehman elevated levels – but now they more
clearly reflected heightened funding and counterparty risk. After Lehman's failure, the prospect of
global recession became imminent, auguring the further deterioration of banks' loan portfolios. At
this point the entire global financial system had become infected.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
  One enduring question about the financial turbulence that engulfed the world starting 
in the summer of 2007 is how problems in a small corner of U.S. financial markets—
securities backed by subprime mortgages accounting for only some 3 per cent of U.S. 
financial assets—could infect the entire U.S. and global banking systems. This paper seeks to 
shed further light on that question. We analyze the risk premium on debt owed by individual 
banks as measured by banks’ credit default swap (CDS) spreads, focusing on the CDS 
spreads of the 45 largest financial institutions in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.
2   
We use principal components analysis to extract the common factors underlying 
weekly variations in the CDS spreads of individual banks.  If the spreads for different banks 
move independently, then we can infer that the risk of bank failure is driven by bank-specific 
factors.  If they move together then we infer that banks are perceived as subject to common 
risks.  This provides us with the first bit of evidence on how the crisis spread. 
In addition to estimating the importance of common factors we attempt to ascertain 
what they reflect.  We examine the correlation between the common factors on the one hand 
and real-economy influences outside the financial system, transactional relationships among 
                                                 
2 These swaps are insurance contracts.  The buyer of the CDS makes payments to the seller in order to receive a 
payment if a credit instrument (e.g. a bond or a loan) goes into default or in the event of a specified credit event, 
such as bankruptcy.  The spreads are, in effect, a measure of the credit risk or the insurance premium charged.  
Although CDS spreads are implicitly spreads on the issuers’ bonds, they have the advantage, as Longstaff et al. 
(2008) point out, that they are “less encumbered by covenants and guarantees.” However, there has been a 
recent concern that speculative pressure within the CDS market sometimes causes the swaps to become 
delinked from their function of hedging against default (Soros, 2009). Longstaff et al. (2008) analyze spreads on 





banks, and transactional influences between banks and other parts of the financial system on 
the other.
3 
We reach three conclusions. First, the share of common factors was already quite 
high, at 62 percent, prior to the outbreak of the Subprime Crisis in July 2007.  Banks’ 
fortunes rose and fell together to a considerable extent, in other words, even before the crisis.  
These common factors were correlated with U.S. high-yield spreads—the premium paid 
relative to Treasury bonds by U.S. corporations that had less than investment grade credit 
ratings—which we take as an indicator of the perceived probability of default by less 
creditworthy U.S. corporations, which in turn reflects economic growth prospects.
4  For 
obvious reasons, those defaults and the growth performance that drives them have major 
implications for the condition of the banking system even in normal times.   
The share of the variance accounted for by common factors then rose to 77 percent in 
the period between the July 2007 eruption of the Subprime Crisis and Lehman’s failure in 
September 2008.   This is indicative of a perception that banks as a class faced higher 
common risks than before.  At the same time, the correlation between the common factors 
and U.S. high-yield spreads declined, while the correlation with measures of banks’ own 
credit risk and of generalized risk aversion increased (Brunnermeier, 2009).  An 
interpretation is that the Subprime Crisis made investors more wary about the risks in bank 
                                                 
3 To be clear, we do not attempt to identify causality. However, the correlations offer a rich set of stylized 
characterizations. These characterizations are likely to be the basis for defining and probing more subtle 
hypotheses. 
4 These high-yield spreads have been found to be good predictors of U.S. growth at horizons of about a year, 
reflecting a financial-accelerator interaction between credit markets and the real economy (Mody and Taylor, 
2003). Because European high-yield spreads are closely correlated with US spreads and, as such, offer no 
additional information, U.S. high-yield spreads (spreads of corporations with less than investment-grade rating) 




portfolios for reasons largely independent of the evolution of the real economy but that lack 
of detailed information on those risks led them to treat all banks as riskier rather than 
discriminating among them. 
Following Lehman’s failure, there was a further brief increase in the share of the 
variance accounted for by the common components. Then, although the level of CDS spreads 
remained high, the share of their variation accounted for by the common component fell back 
relatively quickly to levels about those that prevailed just before the Lehman episode. In 
other words, the common movements declined from their peaks but remained at the post-
Bear Stearns elevated levels. Thus, the perception persisted that the banks’ fortunes were 
linked. The correlation between the common factors and high-yield corporate spreads also 
reemerged, evidently reflecting the perception that a global recession was now in train. More 
importantly, the common component of CDS spreads became more highly correlated with 
measures of funding and credit risk as measured by spreads in the asset-backed commercial 
paper market and LIBOR minus the overnight index swap. An interpretation is that whereas 
in the July 2007-September 2008 period investors became more aware of systemic risk in an 
unfocused sense, Lehman’s failure caused that common risk to be more concretely identified 
with both developments in the real economy and specific problems in the financial system. 
In sum, then, our answer to the question posed in the title is thus as follows.  Banks 
fortunes rise and fall together even in normal times.  But the importance of common factors 
rose to exceptional levels between the outbreak of the Subprime Crisis and the rescue of Bear 
Stearns, reflecting increased diffuse sense that credit risk was increasing.  The period 
following the failure of Lehman Brothers then saw a further increase in those 




were direct spillovers, as opposed to common movements, from the CDS spreads of U.S. 
banks to those of European banks. After Lehman’s failure the prospect of global recession 
became imminent, auguring the further deterioration of banks’ loan portfolios.  At this point 
the entire global financial system had become infected.  
It is helpful to be clear about what this paper does not do. It does not pinpoint any one 
bank or set of banks as systemically-important. Rather, the extent of comovement in spreads 
points to tendencies of the degree to which the system is perceived to be tied to common 
factors. An individual bank within the set examined may be more or less tied to the common 
factors to the extent that it has a large or small extent of idiosyncratic risk. Ultimately, then, 
the methodology outlined here is a guide for policy only to the extent that it highlights 
overall trends. The task of determining the systemic importance of an individual bank 
requires examining the data in the books of the banks—or worse, at data that should be on 
the books but is not.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II specifies a dynamic factor 
model in which common latent factors explain the movement of the CDS spreads of the 45 
banks in our sample. The model is estimated using principal components analysis, allowing 
the contributions of the components to change over time. In Section III, we consider the 
possibility of additional spillovers from inter-bank exposures that go beyond the common 
movements identified by the latent factors. Then in Section IV, we describe the changing 
correlations between these latent factors and a number of high frequency financial series. A 





II.   COMMON FACTORS IN CDS SPREADS 
We start by decomposing the movement in credit default swap (CDS) spreads of 45 
global banks into common and idiosyncratic components.
5 The sample runs from July 29, 
2002 to November 28, 2008.
6 The data are 5-year CDS spreads, the five year maturity being 
the most widely traded. We use end-of-day quotes from the New York market for payment in 
U.S. dollars based on U.S. dollar-denominated notional amounts. As is customary, the 
spreads are denominated in basis points (100 basis points equal 1 percentage point). These 
are averaged over the week to obtain a weekly series, smoothing out sharp daily movements 
and irregular trading, yielding 331 observations per bank. The data are from Bloomberg. 
 
II.1 Preliminary data analysis 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on spreads for 45 banks. Average spreads over the 
period vary significantly across banks (from a low of 17 for Rabobank to a high of 101 basis 
points for AIG).
7  Our interest is not so much in the cross-sectional variation at this stage, 
however, as in the variation over time, which has been substantial. Unlike sovereign CDS 
spreads where the standard deviations are typically smaller than the means, the standard 
deviations of the CDS spreads of financial institutions studied here are close to the means 
and sometimes larger. The minimum/maximum values further highlight the considerable 
                                                 
5 The term “banks” is used throughout, although some insurance companies are also included in the sample. 
6 Thereafter, the intense involvement of the U.S. authorities in managing the short-term vulnerability of the 
financial sector increasingly reflects the official interventions, which, because they operated differentially 
across the institutions, limits the validity of a market-driven common set of influences on their CDS. 
7 This variation is, however, smaller than the 100-fold variation in premia across the Japanese and Brazilian 




time-series variation. For example, the spread for Merrill Lynch ranges from 15 to 473 basis 
points; in Europe, the range for Commerzbank varies from 8 to 260 basis points.  
Figure 1 tracks the time variation in median spreads for all banks, U.S. banks, and 
European banks. In 2002, after the tech bubble burst and confidence was challenged by the 
events of September 11, 2001, CDS spreads were elevated. Some banks were able to 
purchase protection at relatively low spreads of 20-50 basis points, but others paid more than 
100 basis points. Subsequently spreads declined everywhere. The low point was the week of 
January 17, 2007 when the median spread in the full sample of 45 banks was 7.5 basis points. 
Thereafter, spreads increased gradually, reaching a median of 12 basis points in the second 
week of July 2007. But even in that week, the highest spread was 55 basis points for Bear 
Stearns.
8 In contrast, the subsequent rise in spreads was dramatic with twin peaks 
corresponding to the Bear Stearns rescue and the Lehman Brothers failure. For U.S. banks, a 
high of 417 basis points was reached following the severe stress after the Lehman failure 
during the week of October 1, 2008; the median spread then moderated to 268 basis points in 
the last week of November 2008. The corresponding numbers for the European banks were 
130 and 97 basis points, respectively.  
 
II.2 A dynamic factor model of CDS spreads 
The first question we ask is whether the movements in spreads reflected common 
drivers. To answer that question we estimate the “latent” or unobserved factors generating 
common movements. The relationship between these unobserved factors ( t F  ) and the 
                                                 




observed spreads ( t i X , ) can be approximately represented by a dynamic factor model 
(Chamberlain and Rothchild, 1983): 
it t i i t h i t i X L F X ε φ + + Λ = −1 , , , ) (    (1) 
t i X ,  is a vector of the weekly changes in CDS spreads of each of the 45 banks, where “i” 
refers to a bank and “t” is the time subscript.  i Λ  is a matrix of factor loadings, and  t h F ,  are 
latent factors (h=1,…,k).  The estimation procedure allows for  t i X ,  to be serially correlated 
and for  it ε to be cross-sectionally correlated and heteroscedastic.
9 Stacking the terms, 
specification (1) can be equally represented as: 
ε + Φ + Λ′ = X L F X ) (    (2) 
where X and ε are TxN matrices, F is a Txk, and Λ is a Nxk matrix. 
The idea here is that the covariance among the series can be captured by a few 
unobserved common factors. The latent factors and their loadings can be consistently 
estimated by the method of principal components. As Bai and Ng (2002, 2008) and Stock 
and Watson (2002) show, the principal component (PC) estimator enables us to identify 
factors up to a change of sign and consistently estimate them up to an orthonormal 
transformation.
10 The procedure also provides a measure of the fraction of the total variation 
explained by each factor, which is computed as the ratio between the k largest eigenvalues of 
the matrix X′X divided by the sum of all eigenvalues.  
                                                 
9 Note, however, that the contribution of the idiosyncratic covariances to the total variance needs to be bounded 
(Bai and Ng, 2008), which puts a limit on the amount of cross-correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
10 Note that the consistency is related to the space spanned by the factors and not with respect to the individual 
factor estimates. Under standard regulatory conditions, Bai and Ng (2008) establish consistency of the estimates 




The data for each bank are first filtered for autocorrelation since in the presence of 
serial correlation the covariance matrix of the data will not have the factor structure (exact or 
approximate) and as such can lead to biased inference. To assess the changes over time, the 
model is estimated recursively after the first 150 data points: as such, the filtering is also 
performed recursively. At each recursion an AR(p) model is applied to each series, where the 
order, p, is determined using the individual partial autocorrelation function (PACF) and 
residuals from the AR(p) model are used as the filtered series. The data is then tested for non-
stationarity and, as expected, unit root tests indicate no evidence of nonstationarity in the 
series.
11 Finally, all series are standardized at each recursion since principal component 
estimates are not scale invariant. 
 
II.3 Estimation results and discussion 
Figure 2 shows changes over time in the contributions of the common factors to the 
total variance in the CDS data. Recall that up until mid-July 2007, i.e., before the start of the 
subprime crisis, absolute movements in bank CDS spreads were small. The principal 
components analysis shows that even in this relatively tranquil period the perceived riskiness 
of different international banks moved together to a considerable extent. The first component 
contributed just above 40 percent of these movements and the second a further 10 percent. 
Together the first four common factors explained about 60 percent of movements in CDS 
spreads in this period.
12 The statistical procedure does not tell us of course whether these 
                                                 
11 To save space, these results are not reported.  
12 Factors other than the first four individually explained less than 4 percent of the variation. Thus, our analysis 
below focuses on the PC estimates obtained using the four factor “space.” This is supported by the results 





common influences reflected interconnections within the banking system or were the result 
of common external factors. To explore that distinction, in Section IV, we report evidence on 
the correlations of the common “unobserved” factors and observed variables representing 
real economic prospects and metrics of banks’ funding stress and their systemic credit risk. 
A new phase commenced in July 2007, when HSBC announced large subprime-mortgage 
related losses and CDS spreads rose sharply. While spreads retreated somewhat in the 
months thereafter, they remained at significantly higher levels. Nevertheless, July 2007 saw 
the start of a tendency towards an increase in the comovement of spreads. The rise in the 
share of variance explained by the first factor and the first four factors combined trended up 
even as the average spreads rose and fell. Thus, while the sense of crisis went into remission 
periodically in late 2007 and early 2008, the perception remained that banks faced common 
risks. By early March 2008, prior to the rescue of Bear Stearns, the share of the first 
component had risen by about 15 percentage points to 56 percent.  
The importance of the common factors continued to increase following the Bear 
Stearns rescue, reaching a new high in May 2008, at which point the first common factor 
explained almost 60 percent of the variance of CDS spreads. Then, the period between May 
and September 2008 was one of general weakness of financial-market indicators. The share 
of the variance explained by common components of CDS spreads exhibited some slight 
tendency to decline in this period, although it remained not very far below the high level 
reached in May. 
                                                                                                                                                         
through a grid of parameter values. The Bai and Ng (2002) information criterion does lead to the possibility of 
more than four factors, but this criterion tends to overestimate the number of factors in samples with relatively 
small cross-sections and  high cross-correlations (Anderson and Vahid, 2007, Onatski, 2006). As a practical 





The failure of Lehman Brothers was accompanied by a further increase in 
comovement of spreads.
13  The share of the variation accounted for by the first principal 
component jumped to 65 percent, while the share accounted for by the first four reached 80 
percent. However, there was moderation of the comovement by the first week of October, as 
the share of the variance accounted for by the common factors fell back to pre-Lehman 
levels.     
To get a sense of whether the degree of commonality we observe for international 
banks is high or low, we can compare these results with those of Longstaff et al. (2008) for 
sovereign CDS spreads. Longstaff et al. found that the fraction of the variance of spreads on 
the CDS of 26 sovereigns explained by the first component varied between 32 and 48 
percent. Note that they used monthly (rather than weekly) changes in spreads and the higher 
share is for months in which observations were available for all sovereigns. These features of 
their analysis smooth out some part of the idiosyncratic movements and, to that extent, might 
overstate the commonality. As such, the initial—pre-subprime—contribution of the first 
component of banks’ spreads at about a 40 percent share is at least in a comparable range, 
and possibly implies greater commonality. That share of the first component for the banks, as 
we have reported, then rose to approximately 60 percent just before the Lehman failure and 
further to 65 percent just after. When considering the first four components, Longstaff et al. 
(2008) find that they explain 60 to 70 percent of the share of sovereign spreads variation, 
which is comparable to our range of 60 to 80 percent. The implication also is that for 
sovereign spreads, the second component and beyond have a more substantial contribution 
                                                 




than is the case for banks, implying greater variety of global common influences on 
sovereign spreads. 
 
III.   ADDITIONAL SPILLOVERS 
In this section, we investigate whether, once the common factors are considered, the 
CDS spread of a particular bank is further influenced by current and lagged changes in CDS 
spreads of other banks. In other words, we ask whether there is significant information in 
CDS spreads of other banks over and above that contained in the common factors.  
These spillover tests are performed by regressing the change in the (non-filtered) CDS spread 
of a bank “i” on its own lags, the common factors, and the (lagged and current) changes in 
CDS spreads of another bank (bank “j), as in equation (3). Since the CDS data exhibit a 
break in the last week of July 2007 we also added a dummy variable for the sub-prime 
period, where ) ( 1 , τ ≥ = − t I X D t j t :
14 
it t t j j t i i i h i t i u D X L X L F X + + + + Λ = − − δ λ φ 1 , 1 , , , ) ( ) (  ( 3 )  
Equation (3) was estimated for each pair of banks, which yielded a total of 2025 regressions. 
In each case, we tested for the statistical significance of the coefficients j λ  by computing the 
heteroskedascity robust Lagrange multiplier (LM) test of specification (3).
15  The restrictions 
are tested using a standard χ² test.
16   
                                                 
14 Bai and Ng (2006a) showed that the so-called “factor-augmented” regressions yield consistent estimates of 
the parameters as T,N→∞ provided that √T/N→0. Of course, in a finite sample the estimation error will not 
disappear completely.   
15 The heteroscedasticity robust estimate of the covariance matrix was obtained using the Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1985)’s transformation of the squared residuals. 
 
16 Simulation results in Clark and McCracken (2005) and Rossi (2005) establish that the likelihood ratio test 





In only about 2½ percent of the 2025 possible relationships is the CDS spread of 
another bank significant at the 5 percent significance level. This supports the validity of the 
common factors estimated in the preceding section.
17 The relatively few additional spillovers 
we identify are illustrated in Figure 3(a). Following the start of the sub-prime crisis, the 
incidence of such spillovers declined, implying that the commonality is well captured by the 
latent factors. However, the additional spillovers increased notably starting in mid-July 2008 
and reached their maximum during the Lehman Brothers crisis.  An interpretation is that not 
just global economic drivers (which are presumably being picked up by the common factors) 
but also counterparty risk and other similarities in a few banks’ portfolios (which are being 
captured by the additional spillovers) figured importantly in individual CDS spreads around 
the time of the Lehman Brothers failure.
18 The banks for which additional spillovers matter 
tend to be well-known names: they include ING, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Scotland, and 
UBS in Europe, and Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and Morgan Stanley in the United 
States. 
Our procedure also allows us to glean some evidence of international spillovers.  Here 
we consider the percentage of banks in the U.S. significantly influenced by a bank in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
regression subject to the structural break provided that the relationship existed for any subsample (i.e. before or 
after the break). It is well known that in the presence of breaks and heteroscedasticity, all classical tests may be 
oversized (Hansen, 2000). We also run the robust bootstrap LM test based on the fixed design wild bootstrap 
(Hansen, 2000) and recursive wild bootstrap (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004), but the results were not significantly 
different. In addition, we also performed a battery of Monte Carlo experiments using the robust LM and Wald 
statistics (with and without bootstrapping) and while both tests had similar power properties the LM test had 
more conservative rejection rates. 
 
17 In contrast, if we estimate the same specification without controlling for common factors, more than half of 
the relationships show (misleading) evidence of spillovers. In other words, the presence of common factors that 
drive spreads reflecting common vulnerabilities faced by banks better characterizes the co-movements of bank 
spreads than direct influences from one bank to another. 
18 The importance of counterparty problems due to the failure of Lehman Brothers is emphasized by, inter alia, 




European Union (Figure 3b) and vice versa (Figure 3c). Note that we are not looking here at 
pairwise influences; rather the question is what percentage of banks has at least one cross-
border relationship with evidence of additional spillovers.
19  
The period before the sub-prime crisis is relatively stable with moderate evidence of 
spillovers from the European Union to the U.S. (Figure 3b) and little evidence of spillovers 
from the U.S. banks to European banks (Figure 3c). Following the start of the crisis in July 
2007, in contrast, the incidence of additional spillovers from the U.S. system to Europe 
increased, particularly in periods of high distress (in August 2007 and from the beginning of 
July 2008 onwards). Interestingly, the magnitude of additional spillovers from European to 
U.S. banks declined in this period. This is consistent with a view that developments in U.S. 
banks were the stronger source of perceived financial risk starting in the early stages of the 
subprime crisis. 
 
IV.   CORRELATING LATENT FACTORS WITH OBSERVED FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
The next step is to look for economic correlates of the latent factors identified in 
Section II. We first present findings that correlate the “space” spanned by the first four 
principal components.  We then discuss correlations separately for the first and the second 
principal components.
20 
                                                 
19 Clearly, this leads to a larger fraction of banks than where the assessment is on a pairwise basis. 
20 An alternative approach would be to regress observed CDS spreads on a combination of bank-specific and 
macro variables. Such an approach would, in principle, allow the bank-specific variables to account for the 
idiosyncratic movements and the macro variables to explain the common movements. Since our immediate 
interest is in the common changes, a statistically-rigorous examination of correlations between the latent CDS 
factors—identified in the first stage of our analysis—with observed macro variables appears the most direct 
approach.  The regression approach may also be misleading in this context since, even when the observed series 
are highly correlated with the factors, they might still be found to be weakly correlated with the CDS data if the 




IV.1 Some Statistical Considerations 
There are several approaches to studying such correlations. Bai and Ng (2006b) have 
developed statistical criteria to investigate whether any candidate observed series yields the 
same information that is contained in the set of factors. The general idea is to examine if the 
observed series can be represented as a linear combination of the latent factors allowing for a 
limited degree of noise in the relationship. Instead of examining the relationship with the 
entire factor space, the observed series can also be correlated with a particular factor 
subspace, including a particular factor. Ahn and Perez (2008) implement an estimation 
procedure that consistently determines the number of factors that can be related to the set of 
observable series of interest.
21 Once this number of factors is determined, the individual 
correlations between factors and the observed series can be examined. The Ahn and Perez 
analysis makes the strong assumption of independence between the idiosyncratic part of the 
movement in CDS spreads and the observed series. If that assumption is invalid, then the 
results will be biased since the rejections of the null hypothesis of no correlation may occur 
for any number of factors related to the observables. To obtain robust results we therefore 
adopt a pre-step estimation procedure to validate the series of observables we use.
22  
                                                 
21 This procedure is essentially an extension of Andrews and Lu’s (2001) general approach to model and 
moment selection in the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation. 
22 Given the structure of the procedure and if the true number of factors is known and equal to k, then for m 
observed series it follows that if we reject the null hypothesis that m(N-k) moment conditions are zero, this may 
happen only if the instruments (observed series) are correlated with a subset of the idiosyncratic errors. If the 
observed series were correlated with all idiosyncratic errors, then this would imply the existence of another 
factor in the data. The pre-step procedure can be seen as leading to a conservative selection of correlates since 
we exclude all observable series that are correlated with both the factors and idiosyncratic variations: the 
selected observables are then very robust. The useful pre-step therefore is to compute a J-test using standard 
optimal HAC weighting matrix for m(N-k) moment conditions and test whether the null can be rejected. 
Following the non-rejection of the null, Ahn and Perez (2008)’s model selection procedure can be applied; 




Further considerations apply to each approach—that relating the observed series to 
the space of factors and the individual factor correlates. With regard to the Bai and Ng 
(2006b) R-squared and NS criteria, it is not straightforward to determine the threshold that 
would signal a “matching” between the factor space and individual series of interest when the 
relationship is contaminated with some degree of noise. With regard to correlations with 
individual factors, the concern is whether these correlations uniquely identify the 
relationships with a particular factor. For instance, finding a correlation of 0.5 between the 
first factor and a series of interest may genuinely reflect a correlation but may also be 
spuriously picking up a correlation between the second factor and the series. This is a direct 
consequence of the non-consistency of the individual PC estimates, irrespective of whether 
the unobserved factors are correlated or not. In general, the literature has not fully dealt with 
these issues. It is commonplace to report the criteria and the correlations without 
acknowledging their non-uniqueness. To evaluate the seriousness of these limitations, we 
used a Monte Carlo experiment to investigate how these procedures behave to reassure 
ourselves that the results are meaningful and robust.
23 
                                                 
23  We perform two sets of experiments (not reported but available upon request). Both experiments are 
designed as to resemble the characteristics of the (change in) CDS data. We allow for the data to be cross-
correlated and heteroskedastic and subject to a break in volatility and occasional outliers. In the first experiment 
the factors explain a roughly equal percentage of total variation, whereas the second experiment captures the 
situations when the first factor explains the largest part of the overall variance and when its importance 
increases after the break point. The “observable” series are generated through a linear relationship with factor(s) 
with a varying degree of noise. The R-squared and NS criterion and simple correlations between observable 
series and the estimates of the first two factors were obtained using 5000 simulations. Ahn and Perez’s (2008) 
GMM-based BIC criteria were computed using 1000 simulations and 100 randomizations to save on computing 
time.  The main findings from the experiment are the following. First, the GMM-based BIC criterion performs 
fairly well selecting in all cases the correct number of factors. The proposed pre-step estimation captures 
whenever the series are correlated with the idiosyncratic errors. Second, the R-squared and NS estimates are 
significantly lower (higher) than those proposed by Bai and Ng (2006b) when there is some noise in the relation 
and breaks in volatility. In particular, the R-squared estimates we highlight below are meaningful measures of 
the relationships of interest under the moderate levels of noise. Third, the signal-to-noise ratio from using 







We limit our attention to U.S. variables, since the corresponding European variables 
are highly correlated with U.S. series. A first set of variables representing the real economy 
includes the corporate default risk measured by the high-yield spread (HYS), risk aversion 
(VIX), and returns on the S&P stock index.
24 A second set of variables representing the 
banks’ financial risks includes the credit risk spread (LIBOR minus overnight index swap), 
liquidity spread (overnight index swap minus the Treasury bill yield), and spreads on asset 
backed commercial paper (ABCP).
25  
The GMM-based model and moment selection criterion of the validity of the 
observed series is performed first and the results are presented in Table 2. The test is 
performed for the full sample and two sub samples (up to July 2007 and up to May 2008) in 
order to examine whether the most recent period (with possible outliers) is influencing the 
results. In the first column of Table 2 we can see that none of the proposed series is 
correlated with the idiosyncratic part of CDS spreads since the frequency of rejections of the 
null among all randomizations of the data is very small for all samples. This implies that we 
can use the moment selection criterion to investigate the relationship between the observed 
series and the factors. In turn, the results from full and sub-sample estimation of the criterion 
                                                                                                                                                         
that finding a high correlation between the first factor and individual observed series cannot be an artifact of 
correlation between the other factor and that series. The same does not hold when the factors have a similar 
contribution to the overall variation in the data. 
24 VIX is the implied volatility on the S&P 100 (OEX) option and is a widely used measure of global risk 
aversion. 
25 As with the CDS data, all series are recursively filtered and checked for nonstationarity and are standardized 




suggest that the information in the set of observed series is correlated with the three or four 
factor subspace and that the patterns followed by the individual series are not spurious.
26 
IV.3 The Real Economy Prior to the Subprime Crisis 
In the “real economy” group, we consider three correlates. High-yield spreads (HYS, 
spreads on bonds issued by less-than-investment-grade issuers) reflect increased corporate 
default probabilities and do well in predicting short-term growth prospects (Mody and 
Taylor, 2003). The S&P 500 average reflects the market’s perception of the economic 
outlook, while the VIX is a measure of economic volatility embedded in stock price 
movements.  
Figure 4 shows the evolution of (median) CDS spreads in relation to these observed 
variables. Prior to the start of the subprime crisis, the HYS and the VIX trended down along 
with the median CDS spreads. As the figure suggests and we show below, the real economy 
as represented by the stock market bore less short-term relationship with the movement in 
CDS spreads. The HYS, VIX, and CDS spreads were all at low levels prior to July 2007. 
And while they rose subsequently, their short-term movements became less correlated 
between the start of the subprime crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers.  
In Figure 5, panel A, we show the correlation of the first four factor space with HYS; 
this was relatively high prior to the subprime crisis. The R-squared criterion gives a value of 
0.5 on the eve of the subprime crisis. In contrast, the correlation with the S&P returns is 
                                                 
26 For the full sample, the various criteria suggest the existence of a relationship between the series and four 
factors. For the sub-samples BIC1 suggests a relationship with only one factor, whereas three or four factors are 
picked by other criterion. Given that apart from the first factor, all other factors may be perceived as weak, 
BIC1 may underselect the true number of relationships, as shown in the simulation study. On the other hand, 




low—the R-squared is less than 0.1. Notice that the R-squared for the VIX lies in between, 
but at 0.2 is at the lower end of the range.  
The implication is that perceptions of banks’ risk in that tranquil period were shaped 
by a global factor that is best summarized by corporate default risk. This is reasonable not 
just because of the banks’ direct exposure to default risk but also because HYS have a proven 
track record as a forward-looking predictor of economic prospects (Mody and Taylor, 2003). 
In particular, HYS movements capture the operation of the financial accelerator: high spreads 
imply high expected default rates (and hence lower collateral), lower credit supply, reduced 
growth prospects, and hence higher spreads. HYS has also been found to be a significant 
explanatory variable of emerging market spread differences across countries and movements 
over time (see Eichengreen and Mody, 2000, and Longstaff et al., 2008, who find it to be the 
most potent of their candidate variables). In contrast, stock returns include both upside and 
downside movements: while high stock returns presumably lower risk to a degree, banks’ 
risks are apparently more clearly defined by downside risks as reflected in the HYS. The fact 
that the correlation with the VIX is significantly smaller than for HYS suggests that a 
generalized risk aversion does not necessarily translate into banks’ risk premia. 
These interpretations are supported by the correlations with specific factors reported 
in Panel B of Figure 5. Up through the start of the subprime crisis, the HYS was most highly 
correlated with the first principal component of CDS spreads.
27 In contrast, there was almost 
no correlation with the second factor. The same was true the VIX (panel C). In contrast, S&P 
returns had a higher correlation with the second factor (panel D). An interpretation is that the 
first factor reflects global perceptions of downside risks, while the second gives more weight 
                                                 




to general movements in expected future profitability. Note, though, that the second factor 
explains a much smaller fraction of the overall variance of CDS spreads.  Hence returns had 
a much weaker association with spreads’ movements.   
 
IV.4 The Emergence of Financial Factors 
Thus, prior to the subprime crisis, global economic factors as summarized in the HYS 
were the main drivers of the CDS spreads of international banks. Following the onset of the 
crisis and through the Bear Stearns bailout, however, the correlation with the HYS declined 
(Figure 5, panel A). The decline in the overall correspondence between the HYS and the 
factor space reflected a decline in correlation with the increasingly important first factor of 
CDS spreads and occurred despite some increase in correlation with the second factor (panel 
B). Evidently, there was some dissociation with the real economy despite the fact that banks’ 
prospects appear to have been perceived as increasingly correlated with one another in this 
period.  Intuitively, the common risk did not obviously emanate from a sense of worsening of 
economic prospects. Moreover, an initial sharp increase in correlation with the VIX, 
reflecting generalized risk aversion, died down to pre-crisis levels by the time of Bear 
Stearns (Figure 5, panels A and C). The small rise in the correlation between S&P returns 
and the CDS factor space probably reflects that that fears about the stability of the banking 
system were driven more by problems in the banks’ positions in securities than by the ability 
of their corporate customers to stay current on their loans. 
Once the subprime crisis started, the relevance of financial variables, particularly 
those related to banks’ credit and funding risks, acquired greater prominence. A common 




interbank loans (we use the US dollar, 3-month LIBOR) and short-term U.S. government 
debt (3-month US Treasury bills). This captures the risk premia on bank borrowing, since 
LIBOR is the rate at which banks borrow and Treasury bills (T-Bills) are considered risk-
free.  
However, the TED spread reflects not just banking sector credit risk but also includes 
liquidity or flight-to-quality risk. These two categories of risks can be approximately 
decomposed. TED=(LIBOR-OIS)+(OIS-“T-Bill”), where the OIS is an “overnight index 
swap;” which measures the expected daily average Fed Funds rate over the next 3 months. 
Thus, TED can be decomposed into the banking sector credit risk premium (LIBOR-OIS) 
and liquidity or flight-to-quality premium (OIS-T-Bill).
28  
The TED spread rose sharply in the post-Lehman-crisis period as Figure 6 shows. 
While the liquidity premium (the OIS-T-Bill differential) also increased, the more substantial 
increase was in the credit risk (the LIBOR-OIS differential). Note also the spike after the 
start of the subprime crisis in the spread on asset-backed commercial paper. Since banks use 
these instruments for their short-term funding, the rise in this spread proxies the risks 
associated with rollover in short-term funding. That the market for asset-backed commercial 
paper issued by banks and conduits collapsed within days of the Lehman bankruptcy is well 
known; see Jones (2009).
29   
                                                 
28 Of course, the OIS-TB spread picks up some credit risk, but most analysts now view the “general collateral” 
repo rate as the “risk free” rate, and that plots very closely to the OIS rate.  The LIBOR-OIS spread is analyzed 
by Taylor (2009) and critiqued by Jones (2009). 
29 Note also from Figure 6 that the LIBOR-OIS spread moved rather closely with the spreads on asset-backed 





The correlation of the common factors with these financial variables, which had been 
historically close to zero, rose following the start of the crisis (Figure 7). Thus perceived 
bank risk, which had previously stemmed mainly from the development of the real economy, 
now stemmed more from banks’ own internal credit and funding risks. But while liquidity 
risk (as captured by the OIS-T-bill spread) and the ABCP spread showed some correlation 
with the CDS factor space initially, those correlations were not sustained. In contrast, the 
correlation with credit risk was sustained. Credit risk had the largest correlation of these three 
financial variables with the factor space after the start of the crisis; in particular, the 
correlation with the first factor rose steadily up until Bear Stearns. 
While the change in the pattern of correlations clearly points to greater emphasis on 
the internal workings of the banking system (rather than to the broader global economy), the 
correlations we find even at their elevated levels during this phase are small.
30 To the extent 
that banks’ credit risk and funding risk did become more important, our measures for these 
features may not be sufficiently encompassing. In addition other concerns, such as lack of 
transparency of the complex asset holdings, may have also acquired greater prominence in 
assessing bank risks. 
Not much changed between the Bear Stearns rescue and the Lehman failure. The 
correlation with HYS stabilized at below pre-crisis levels and the correlation with credit risk 
remained significantly above pre-crisis levels. The other correlations remained low, near 
their pre-crisis levels. Thus while corporate default risk remained a salient factor determining 
                                                 
30 Thus, to a degree the rise in the share of the first component (and first four components) of CDS spreads 




banks’ risk, there was a shift as this traditionally-dominant factor lost ground and the risk that 
banks themselves may not be able to honor each others obligations gained prominence. 
 
IV. 5 After Lehman 
The immediate post-Lehman phase is remarkable for the unprecedented alignment of 
risks. The correlation between the CDS factor space and all of their correlates rose, according 
the R-squared criterion, with the correlations with the financial variables increasing most 
sharply. The increase in credit and funding risk premia reflected the stress faced by banks.  In 
addition, these developments presumably contributed to a revision of prospects of the real 
economy that further undermined confidence in the condition of and prospects for the 
banking system. 
By the R-squared criterion, the correlation between the space of common factors in 
bank CDS spreads and the HYS increased following the failure of Lehman, reversing its 
decline in the preceding four-plus quarters. The correlation with the S&P returns showed a 
particularly large increase as global economic prospects were seen as increasingly tied to the 
fortunes of banks. In contrast, despite the high level of VIX during this period, the correlation 
between the CDS factor space and VIX increased relatively little. In contrast, there was an 
especially sharp increase in the correlation between the financial variables and the common 
factor in banks’ CDS spreads.  
Differences in the correlations between these real and financial variables and the first 
and second common factors provide further intuition. The financial stress indicators became 
more correlated with the first factor of CDS spreads; that correlation rose to levels that had 




moved the first factor in the past, declined sharply in importance in the immediate post-
Lehman phase. Instead, the correlation between the real economy and the common CDS 
movements shifted to the smaller, second factor. 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
We have analyzed common factors in bank credit default swaps both before and 
during the credit crisis that broke out in July 2007 in order to better understand how this 
crisis spread from the subprime segment of the U.S. financial market to the entire U.S. and 
global banking system.  We showed first common factors in CDS spreads are present even in 
normal times; they reflect the impact of the macroeconomy—the ultimate common factor 
from this point of view—on banks as a group.  But the importance of the common factor 
increased significantly between the eruption of the Subprime Crisis in July 2007 and the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  This increase in the common factor seems to 
have been associated with a proxy for the banking-sector credit-risk premium, especially in 
the period prior to the rescue of Bear Stearns.  In contrast, the correlation with the state of the 
real economy, which had been evident prior to the crisis, appears to have been somewhat 
attenuated.  In this abnormal period investors, in other words, investors were not yet 
concerned so much with the prospect of a global recession that would impact the banks’ loan 
books as with other credit risks affecting the banks – connected, presumably, with their 
investments in subprime related securities.   
After the failure of Lehman Brothers the importance of the common factor remained 
elevated.  But where movements in that factor had previously been related to diffuse 




measures of funding risk.  In addition, the correlation of the common factor with the real 
economy reasserted itself, as evidence of the deepening recession mounted.   
What does this evidence imply for policy decisions taken in this period?  With benefit 
of hindsight (which is what a retrospective statistical analysis permits), we can see a 
substantial common factor in banks’ CDS spreads that could have alerted the authorities to 
the risks of allowing a major financial institution to fail.  The further increase in that common 
factor in the period between the outbreak of the Subprime Crisis and the critical decision 
concerning Lehman Brothers should have implied further caution in this regard.  It was not 
the implications of any impending economic slowdown about which investors were primarily 
worried in this period; rather the concern was about the state of the banks’ asset portfolios 
and, presumably, their investments in securities in particular. The heightened comovement at 
least in part reflected incomplete knowledge about the magnitude of toxic asset positions in 
this relatively early stage of the crisis, and, hence, raised the possibility that instability could 
spread more quickly and widely than assumed in the consensus view.  In the event, Lehman 
Brothers was allowed to fail, after which the sensitivity of the CDS spreads of global banks 
as a group experienced heightened sensitivity to the whole range of economic and financial 





Table 1: The Sample of Financial Institutions 
   Mean  Standard 
deviation  Median Minimum  Maximum 
Abbey  26.29 27.36 15.16 4.51  137.93 
Barclays  28.45 37.81 12.21 5.65  251.89 
HBOS  35.64 54.12 13.78 4.84  385.86 
HSBC  23.73 23.88 14.01 4.99  134.96 
Lloyds  TSB  22.39 27.24 12.30 3.87  184.40 
RBS  28.84 39.71 13.02 4.00  289.11 
Standard Chartered  31.65  30.37 18.59 5.87  176.73 
Allianz  36.19 27.76 24.92 6.03  136.59 
Commerzbank 45.81  41.82 27.05 8.14  221.83 
HVB  43.24 36.41 29.64 6.32  167.81 
Deutsche Bank  31.38  28.54 18.29 10.11 161.68 
Dresdner  Bank  34.73 30.22 22.00 5.52  154.83 
Hannover 
Rueckversicherung 44.88  30.08 34.67 8.17  138.25 
Münchner  Hypoth.  32.31 20.56 25.56 5.78  120.19 
Monte dei Paschi    30.90  24.31  21.03  6.17  137.93 
UniCredit 28.27 25.28 16.06 7.65  133.66 
AXA  49.19 46.95 27.93 9.11  235.14 
BNP Paribas  20.51  19.01 12.31 5.51  103.83 
Credit  Agricole  24.19 27.47 13.27 6.08  145.56 
LCL  24.58 27.61 12.58 6.16  150.27 
Société Générale  24.85 27.11 13.25 5.97  138.93 
ABN  AMRO  26.79 29.92 15.03 5.26  172.69 
ING  26.54 31.12 15.44 4.45  163.93 
Rabobank 16.83 22.49 8.35  3.12  131.92 
Banco  Santader  31.46 30.47 16.89 7.68  143.98 
Credit  Suisse  38.98 35.44 20.87 9.04  169.57 
UBS  29.04 43.34 11.63 4.55  276.23 
Banco Comerc. Port.  33.20  28.23 21.86 8.20  145.36 
American  Express  59.97 90.51 25.84 9.07  603.16 
AIG  101.24 310.18 24.87  8.57  2624.15 
Bank  of  America  35.03 33.93 21.34 8.47  191.45 
Bear  Sterns  60.14 62.51 34.47 19.01 574.31 
Chubb  39.28 29.26 29.94 10.01 153.70 
Citibank  43.19 54.79 20.83 7.52  351.93 
Fed. Mortgage  22.81  14.09 20.67 6.35  82.55 
Freddie  Mac  21.77 14.77 19.03 5.28  83.10 
Goldman  Sachs  57.72 64.67 34.33 18.95 437.37 
Hartford  67.82 111.88  36.36 10.82 826.17 
JP  Morgan  44.05 31.96 31.37 11.81 174.98 
Lehman  Brothers  86.00 127.03  36.74 19.49 641.91 
Merrill  Lynch  68.94 77.04 34.60 15.61 417.10 
Met  Life  62.58 108.22  30.46 11.20 790.42 
Morgan  Stanley  73.21 117.44  34.42 18.59 1153.09 
Safeco  46.01 34.38 32.88 18.04 181.00 





Table 2: The Validity of the Correlates 
The Set of 
Correlates  Sample size  JN-4  BIC1 BIC2 BIC3 HQQ 
I1  29/07/2002-28/11/2008  0.01  4(0.52) 4(0.77) 4(0.91) 4(0.74) 
I1  29/07/2002-30/04/2008  0.01  1(0.52) 4(0.64) 4(0.85) 4(0.525) 
I1  29/07/2002-18/07/2007  0.01  1(0.74) 3(0.47) 4(0.87) 4(0.475) 
 
 
Notes: The test formulas are defined in Ahn and Perez (2008). The number of randomizations of the 
cross-section ordering was set to 500. JN-4 shows number of rejections of the moment condition across 
randomizations when the true number of factors is 4 (test for independence of idiosyncratic errors and 
observable series). BIC1, BIC2, BIC3 and HQQ show the number of factors suggested by the 
criterion. The number in brackets is the empirical frequency of the selected number of factors over all 
randomization.  
 
The set of correlates, I1 includes the high-yield spread, the VIX, the S&P 500 Index, the spread on 
asset-backed commercial paper, the spread of the Libor over the overnight index swap, and the spread 
of the overnight index swap over the T-bill rate. 
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Figure 3. Additional Spillovers
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Figure 5. Correlation of Common Components with the "Real Economy"
1/ Based on the R-squared criterion as discussed in the text.
Legend for vertical line indicators:
SUB = Start of Subprime crisis;  BRS=Rescue of Bear Stearns;  LHB=Failure of Lehman Brothers
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Figure 7. Correlation of Common Components with the Costs of Funding
1/ Based on the R-squared criterion as discussed in the text.
Legend for vertical line indicators:
SUB = Start of Subprime crisis;  BRS=Rescue of Bear Stearns;  LHB=Failure of Lehman Brothers
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